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Abstract—For an arbitrary degree distribution pair (DDP), we
construct a sequence of low-density parity-check (LDPC) code
ensembles with girth growing logarithmically in block-length
using Ramanujan graphs. When the DDP has minimum left
degree at least three, we show using density evolution analysis
that the expected bit-error probability of these ensembles, when
passed through a binary erasure channel with erasure probability
, decays as O(exp(−c1nc2)) with the block-length n for positive
constants c1 and c2, as long as  is less than the erasure threshold
th of the DDP. This guarantees that the coset coding scheme
using the dual sequence provides strong secrecy over the binary
erasure wiretap channel for erasure probabilities greater than
1− th.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of information-theoretic security on a communi-
cation system with a passive eavesdropper was first introduced
by Shannon in [1]. This model consists of three parties —
Alice, Bob and Eve; Alice wants to convey a secret message
S to Bob without revealing it to Eve, who can passively
intercept the transmission. Shannon’s model involves noiseless
communication channels and secret communication can be
achieved only if Alice and Bob share an encryption key that
is not known to Eve. Alice converts the message S into an n-
symbol cryptogram Xn using the key K and transmits the
cryptogram to Bob. The communication scheme is said to
attain perfect secrecy if I(S;Xn) = 0. Shannon proved that
perfect secrecy is guaranteed only if H(K) ≥ H(S). In other
words, Alice and Bob must share a secret key that is at least
as long as the confidential message.
Wyner [2] introduced an alternate model called the wiretap
channel where communication occurs over noisy channels,
with Eve receiving a degraded version of the signal received
by Bob. Csisza´r-Ko¨rner [3] considered a generalization of this
model where Eve’s reception need not be a degraded version of
Bob’s received signal. In these models, it is possible to achieve
secret communication without using a pre-shared encryption
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key. This is done by exploiting the fact that the wiretapper’s
channel is “noisier” than the legitimate user’s channel.
Since perfect secrecy may not be achievable over the
wiretap channel for short block-lengths, Wyner introduced
the asymptotic notion of weak secrecy. If Zn is the length-
n symbol vector received by Eve, weak secrecy is said to be
achieved if the rate of information leakage 1n I(S;Z
n) vanishes
as n → ∞. The authors of [2], [3] calculated the secrecy
capacity of the respective channels under the weak secrecy
condition. A shortcoming of weak secrecy is that the amount of
leaked information can be unbounded even if the rate at which
it is leaked goes to zero. Maurer and Wolf [4] highlighted
this shortcoming and introduced the notion of strong secrecy,
which requires that the total amount of leaked information
I(S;Zn) must vanish as n → ∞. Though the strong secrecy
condition is more stringent, it does not reduce the secrecy
capacity [4], [5].
In this paper, we consider the binary erasure wiretap chan-
nel (BEWC) model, where Bob’s channel is noiseless and
Eve’s channel is a binary erasure channel (BEC). Note that
this wiretap model is also called a “binary-erasure-channel
wiretap” (BEC-WT) [6] in literature1. The BEWC model is
important because other wiretap scenarios can be modeled
based on the BEWC. For example, the scenarios with a
noiseless main channel and a binary symmetric or an additive
white Gaussian noise wiretap channel can be modeled [6]
as degraded BEWCs. Moreover, the Erasure Decomposition
Lemma [10, Lemma 4.78] lets us model wiretap systems
with a noiseless main channel and an arbitrary binary-input
memoryless symmetric-output wiretap as degraded BEWCs.
We employ the forward coding approach to achieve secrecy on
our wiretap model. Other approaches, like the ones in [4], [11],
use public discussion on authenticated channels in addition to
communication on the wiretap channel to achieve secrecy on
the overall system.
In [12], Thangaraj, et al. proposed using the duals of low-
density parity-check (LDPC) codes in a “coset coding scheme”
[2], [7] to achieve weak secrecy on the BEWC. They showed
1Liu, et al. [6] considered a generalized version of our BEWC model where
there is a binary-input memoryless symmetric-output wiretap, and called it
a type-II wiretap model. The original type-II wiretap model introduced by
Ozarow-Wyner [7] has a noiseless main channel with a fixed number of
transmitted bits revealed to the eavesdropper. The eavesdropper is also able
to choose which bit locations are revealed to her. These two wiretap models
are different — in [6], the wiretapper’s channel is memoryless, whereas in
[7] it is not.
In [6], the BEWC model is called a BEC-WT. Contrastingly, Rathi, et
al. [8], [9] use BEC-WT to denote the wiretap model with a BEC main
channel and an independent BEC wiretapper’s channel.
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2that this scheme achieves weak secrecy over BEWC(ξ) for
ξ > 1 − th, where th is the BEC threshold of the LDPC
code ensembles under message passing (MP) decoding. As an
extension to this result, Suresh, et al. [13] showed that strong
secrecy on the BEWC can be achieved using the duals of
short-cycle-free LDPC codes in the coset coding scheme. They
first show that a sufficient condition for strong secrecy is to
have the MP block-error probability decay as O(1/n2). Using
a stopping set based analysis, they prove that short-cycle-free
LDPC code ensembles satisfy this condition. Specifically, they
show that strong secrecy is achieved on BEWC(ξ) for ξ > 1−
ef , where ef is the lower bound on error-floor of LDPC codes
defined in [14]. Since ef < th, there is a gap between the
strong and weak secrecy thresholds for finite-girth ensembles.
The work presented in this paper is based on the LDPC code
based coset coding scheme of [12], [13]. We show that the
duals of “large-girth” LDPC codes achieve strong secrecy on
the BEWC with no gap between the strong and weak secrecy
thresholds. We do this by first analyzing the asymptotic
behaviour of the bit-error probability estimate given by density
evolution as the number of iterations increases monotonically.
We then construct irregular Tanner graphs for arbitrary degree
distribution pairs such that the girth of these graphs increases
logarithmically in the number of vertices. This construction,
which can potentially create disconnected Tanner graphs, is
based on the large-girth regular Ramanujan graphs constructed
by Lubotzky, et al. [15]. We show that the LDPC codes based
on our graphs have a bit-error probability that closely follows
the density evolution estimate for increasing iterations. This
property, together with the logarithmic increase in the girth of
the underlying graphs, guarantees that the duals of our LDPC
codes will achieve strong secrecy on the BEWC.
In recent work [16], [17], polar codes have been suggested
as methods for approaching the secrecy capacity of general de-
graded and symmetric wiretap channels, of which the erasure
wiretap channel is a special case. However, since the threshold
phenomenon of LDPC codes is observed at shorter block-
lengths than polarization, there is enough interest in studying
the strong secrecy properties of LDPC code ensembles. Also,
the mechanism of security using polar and LDPC codes is
different. Security of polar codes is proved using the capacity-
approaching properties of these codes. In the case of LDPC
code ensembles over erasure wiretap channels, we use the
duals of codes with a threshold property that need not be close
to capacity.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we give
a brief introduction of the channel model and the coset
coding scheme, and relate the strong secrecy condition to
the bit-error probability of the duals of the codes used in
the coset coding scheme. In Section III, we give a brief
overview of the density evolution analysis for LDPC codes
and state the result regarding the double exponential decay
of the density evolution bit-error probability estimate as the
number of iterations increases. We then show that this result
translates to strong secrecy on the BEWC using the duals of
large-girth regular LDPC codes. In Section IV, we provide a
quick overview of existing constructions for graphs with good
girth. We then describe our construction of large-girth graphs
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Fig. 1. The binary erasure wiretap channel model.
and prove that the duals of the resulting LDPC codes achieve
strong secrecy.
II. COSET CODING SCHEME AND STRONG SECRECY
We consider the binary erasure wiretap channel (BEWC)
model introduced in [12], which consists of two legitimate
parties, Alice and Bob, and an eavesdropper, Eve (Fig. 1).
The channel from Alice to Bob is noiseless and Eve sees the
bits sent to Bob through a binary erasure channel (BEC) with
erasure probability ξ.
Prior to transmission, Alice and Bob publicly agree on a
(n, n(1 − R)) binary linear code C. For each possible value
s of the nR bit secret vector S, we associate a coset of C
given by C(s) = {xn ∈ {0, 1}n : xnHT = s}, where H is
the parity check matrix of C. Note that all the vectors in this
paper are assumed to be row vectors. To convey the message
S to Bob, Alice picks a vector Xn from one of the 2n(1−R)
vectors of C(S) at random and transmits it over BEWC(ξ).
Bob obtains the secret message from the received vector by
calculating XnHT .
The amount of information that is leaked to Eve through
her observation Zn can be bounded [13] as
I(S;Zn) ≤ nRPMAPB (C⊥, 1− ξ)
where PMAPB (C
⊥, 1− ξ) is the block-error probability under
maximum a posteriori (MAP) decoding of the dual code C⊥
transmitted over BEC(1− ξ). A weakened form of this upper
bound can be obtained by substituting PMAPB with P
MP
B ,
the block-error probability using the message passing (MP)
decoder with infinite number of iterations.
The security condition on a sequence of encoding schemes
of increasing block-length n and a constant rate R to achieve
strong secrecy on a wiretap channel is
I(S;Zn)→ 0 as n→∞
Lemma 1 (adapted from [13, Corollary 1]). If (C⊥n ) is
a sequence of binary linear block codes of rate R with
increasing block length n such that for some α > 1,
PMPB (C
⊥
n , 1− ξ) = O
(
1
nα
)
then strong secrecy is achieved on BEWC(ξ) when the dual
sequence (Cn) is used under the coset coding scheme.
We use the standard order notations O, o, Θ, ω and
Ω as defined in [18]. From Lemma 1, it is clear that the
3sequence (Cn) achieves strong secrecy on BEWC(ξ) if the
dual sequence has
PMPB (C
⊥
n , 1− ξ) = O
(
1
n2
)
Using the union bound on the block-error probability,
PMPB (C
⊥
n , 1− ξ) ≤ nPMPb (C⊥n , 1− ξ)
where PMPb is the bit-error probability using the MP decoder.
Corollary 2. If a sequence (Cn) of binary linear codes with
increasing block length n and rate 1−R is such that the dual
sequence (C⊥n ) has a bit-error probability such that
PMPb (C
⊥
n , 1− ξ) = O
(
1
n3
)
then strong secrecy is achieved on BEWC(ξ) when (Cn) is
used under the coset coding scheme.
III. ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOUR OF THE BEC DENSITY
EVOLUTION FORMULA
The asymptotic behaviour of the bit-error probability of
LDPC codes under MP decoding can be tracked using density
evolution [10, Sec. 3.9]. The main result of our paper is based
on the asymptotic behaviour of the BEC density evolution
expression as the number of iterations goes to infinity. Since
density evolution gives only an approximate value of the bit-
error probability and our ultimate aim is to study the asymp-
totic behaviour of the bit-error probability, it is important to
understand where and how approximations are made in density
evolution.
A. Density Evolution Analysis - a Background
Let Hn be an arbitrary ensemble of Tanner graphs with n
variable nodes. Suppose a graph G is selected uniformly at
random from Hn and a random codeword from the associated
block code is transmitted over BEC(). The receiver, with the
knowledge of G, tries to decode the transmitted word using the
MP algorithm. For a family of ensembles (Hn) with increasing
n, let
• x(t, n) = the probability that a randomly selected edge
in the Tanner graph transmits an erasure message from
its variable node to its check node at the tth iteration
• y(t, n) = the probability that a randomly selected code-
word bit is unknown after t iterations
1) Computation Graphs [10, Sec. 3.7.1]: To evaluate
x(t, n) and y(t, n) explicitly, the computation graphs asso-
ciated with the Tanner graph ensemble may be considered.
Suppose a graph G is selected from Hn uniformly at random
and a random edge e is picked from G. Let v be the variable
node connected to e. The level-t edge-rooted computation
graph ~Ct of Hn is defined as the subgraph obtained by
traversing from v up to iteration depth t in all directions except
along e. ~Ct is a random graph whose distribution depends
only on t and Hn. Also, x(t, n) can be uniquely determined
given the possible realizations of ~Ct and their probabilities
(regardless of what Hn is).
Root node
Level-1
Level-2
Leaf variable nodes
Fig. 2. An example of a level-2 decoding neighbourhood tree.
To evaluate y(t, n), the level-t node-rooted computation
graph C˚t, defined subsequently, may be considered. As before,
a graph G is selected from Hn uniformly at random. Then, a
random variable node v is picked from G. C˚t is defined as the
subgraph obtained by traversing from v up to iteration depth
t in all directions. Like ~Ct, C˚t is also dependent only on t and
Hn. y(t, n) can be uniquely determined given the possible
realizations of C˚t and their probabilities (again, regardless of
Hn).
2) Tree Ensembles [10, Sec. 3.7.2]: While studying the
error-correcting performance of LDPC codes, the codes corre-
sponding to the socket permutation ensemble of Tanner graphs,
denoted by G(n, λ, ρ), are usually considered. The graphs in
this ensemble contain n variable nodes, whose degrees are
determined by the degree distribution polynomial λ(x) =∑
i λix
i−1, where λi is the fraction of edges that are connected
to degree-i variable nodes. The check-node degree distribution
is determined by the polynomial ρ(x) =
∑
j ρjx
j−1, where
ρj is the fraction of edges connected to degree-j check nodes.
In the classical setting, Hn = G(n, λ, ρ) is considered,
and x(t, n) and y(t, n) are analyzed while keeping t fixed
and letting n grow monotonically. The possible computation
graphs of G(n, λ, ρ) are not cycle-free and hence enumerating
them is cumbersome. Doing an exact analysis of the bit-
error probability y(t, n) for this ensemble is therefore difficult.
Density evolution resorts to an approximate analysis by con-
sidering tree ensembles, which are asymptotic approximations
of computation graphs.
The node-rooted tree ensemble T˚t is an approximation of
the computation graph C˚t of G(n, λ, ρ). T˚t is a random graph
which takes all possible level-t decoding neighbourhood trees
permitted by (λ, ρ) and it is generated by the following rules.
• The degrees of all nodes are chosen independently.
• The root variable node has degree i with probability Li,
where Li is the fraction of degree-i variable nodes in
G(n, λ, ρ).
• All the leaf variable nodes have degree one.
• All other variable nodes have degree i with probability
λi.
• Check nodes have degree j with probability ρj .
The edge-rooted tree ensemble ~Tt, which is an asymptotic
approximation of ~Ct, is defined in a similar manner, except
for the fact that the root variable node has degree i with
probability λi+1.
Suppose the block code corresponding to the Tanner graph
~Tt is transmitted over BEC(). The probability that the root
4node is unknown after t iterations of the MP decoder, denoted
by xt, is given by the recursive equation
xt = λ(1− ρ(1− xt−1)) =: f(, xt−1)
with x0 = . The threshold th is defined as the supremum of
all values of  for which the sequence (xt) converges to zero.
For the ensemble T˚t a similar probability yt may be defined.
We will have
yt = L(1− ρ(1− xt−1))
where L(x) =
∑
i Lix
i is the degree distribution polynomial
from the node perspective.
B. Density Evolution - Asymptotic Behaviour
It is a well-known result that xt and yt exhibit a double-
exponential decay as t goes to infinity for  < th. A proof
of this result for regular codes is provided in [19, Sec. V-
A]. For the sake of completeness, we state the more general
result for irregular codes and provide an alternative proof (see
Appendix A) involving mathematical induction.
Lemma 3. For a distribution pair (λ, ρ) with minimum
variable node degree lmin ≥ 3 and  < th, we have
xt, yt = O
(
exp(−β(lmin − 1)t)
)
(1)
as t→∞, where β > 0 is a constant.
It is important to note that a similar double exponential
decay result is not true for DDPs that have degree-2 variable
nodes. Working out the expressions for this case, we can
see that xt (and yt) exhibits only an exponential decay in
the number of iterations. Note that xt is the expectation of
the root-node bit-error probability taken over the possible
outcomes of ~T . The dominating term in this expectation is
the contribution of the worst-case trees, namely, the trees
that contain only variable nodes of the least degree. DDPs
with degree-2 variable nodes form a special case where the
contribution by the worst-case trees decays only exponentially.
C. Asymptotic Decay of Bit-Error Probability
Suppose we are given a DDP (λ, ρ) with lmin ≥ 3. For
k = 1, 2, 3, . . ., let (nk) be a strictly increasing sequence of
positive integers and let tk be such that
tk =
⌈
log log nk + log a− log β
log(lmin − 1)
⌉
for any positive integer a. This means that ytk = O (1/nak).
In particular, we have yt = O
(
1/n3
)
for a = 3 (we drop the
subscript k for convenience). Since yt is only an approxima-
tion of y(t, n), this does not necessarily mean that the actual
bit-error probability y(t, n) itself decays as O(1/n3).
Our ultimate aim is to prove an information-theoretic result
and this requires rigorous mathematical proofs. There are only
a few rigorous results regarding the “closeness” of the density
evolution approximation. For example, we know the following
results
• For G(n, λ, ρ)
lim
n→∞x(t, n) = xt, limn→∞ y(t, n) = yt
as long as t remains constant [10, Thm. 3.49].
• The “exchange of limits” result by Korada-Urbanke [20].
To achieve strong secrecy, we must find some ensemble
Hn for which y(t, n) = O(1/n3), where t is growing with
n at least as fast as log log n. In general, this is not true for
G(n, λ, ρ). For example, any irregular DDP with lmin = 3
does not satisfy y(t, n) = O(yt) any  > 0 (see [14, Thm.
16]).
1) Strong Secrecy on the BEWC Using Large-Girth Regular
LDPC Codes: Let Gg(n, λ, ρ) denote the subset of Tanner
graphs in G(n, λ, ρ) whose girth is at least g. Clearly, the
level-t computation graphs of G4t+2(n, λ, ρ) are cycle free.
This means that any possible outcome of C˚t is also a possible
outcome of T˚t. This does not necessarily mean that C˚t and T˚t
are identically distributed and therefore, y(t, n) = yt is not
necessarily true for G4t+2(n, λ, ρ).
The regular LDPC code ensemble G4t+2(n, xc−1, xd−1) is
a special case for which C˚t and T˚t are equal to a unique tree
T . Since y(t, n) is calculated from C˚t in the same way as yt
is calculated from T˚t, we have y(t, n) = yt. Using a similar
reasoning, we can also say that x(t, n) = xt.
In essence, density evolution analysis is approximate be-
cause it makes the following assumptions.
1) The decoding neighbourhood is a tree
2) The degrees of the nodes in the decoding tree can be
chosen independently.
For large-girth Tanner graphs, the first assumption is justified.
However, the second assumption is not justified for large-
girth irregular Tanner graphs. For large-girth regular Tanner
graphs, there is a unique decoding neighbourhood with only
one choice for variable-node degrees and only one choice for
check-node degrees, which means that the second assumption
is also justified. Therefore, we are able to assert that the density
evolution estimate is exact in the case of large-girth regular
LDPC codes, but are unable to do the same for the irregular
counterpart.
Assume that there exists a sequence (C⊥n ) of (c, d)-regular
LDPC codes with c ≥ 3 such that their Tanner graphs have
girth at least 4t+ 2 with
t =
⌈
log log n+ log 3− log β
log(c− 1)
⌉
(The existence of such codes will be proved in the next
section). For these codes, we have
PMPb (C
⊥
n , , t) := y(t, n) = yt (2)
= O
(
1
n3
)
(3)
for  < th. Here, PMPb (C
⊥
n , , t) denotes the bit-error
probability after t iterations. By the above equation, the dual
sequence (Cn) will achieve strong secrecy on BEWC(ξ) for
ξ > 1− th.
IV. LARGE-GIRTH GRAPHS
A. Existence of Large-Girth Graphs
For our scheme to achieve strong secrecy, we require a
sequence of regular bipartite graphs whose girth increases
5Fig. 3. An illustration of Algorithm 1 to create bipartite graphs.
faster than log log n, where n is the number of vertices.
We define a sequence of large-girth graphs as one with a
prescribed degree distribution whose girth increases as log n.
These large-girth graphs satisfy the girth condition required for
strong secrecy. The existence of these graphs is related to the
problem of cages [21] in graph theory. A ν-regular (simple)
graph is one where each vertex has exactly ν neighbours. A
(ν, g) cage is a vertex minimal ν-regular graph of girth g.
Erdo¨s and Sachs [22] showed that cages exist for all ν ≥ 3
and g ≥ 3. For a given ν ≥ 4, let (Rg)g∈N be a sequence of
(ν, g) cages in n(g) vertices. From the upper [23] and lower
[22] lower bounds on n, we have g = Θ(log n). This means
that (Rg) is a sequence of large-girth graphs. Since cages are
not necessarily bipartite and we require a sequence of large-
girth bipartite graphs, we make use of Algorithm 1 [24, Sec.
3.1]. For convenience, we denote the operation performed by
this algorithm by B(·).
Algorithm 1 Construction of a bipartite graph given any graph
[24, Sec. 3.1].
1: Given a graph G in n vertices, create an identical copy
G′ with V (G) ∩ V (G′) = ∅. Let f : V (G) → V (G′) be
a graph homomorphism.
2: Create a graph H with vertex set V (H) = V (G)∪V (G′)
and edge set E(H) = {{x, y} : x ∈ V (G), y ∈
V (G′), f(x) ∼ y in G′}. That is, if a1, b1 ∈ V (G),
a2 = f(a1), b2 = f(b1) and a1b1 ∈ E(G) (or equiva-
lently, if a2b2 ∈ E(G′)), then a1b2, a2b1 ∈ E(H).
Lemma 4. Given a graph G, if H = B(G) then g(H) ≥
g(G).
Proof: For any cycle C in H with the vertices in the order
(u0, v0, u1, v1, . . . , ur−1, vr−1, u0) there exists a closed walk
W = (u0, f
−1(v0), u1, f−1(v1), . . . , ur−1, f−1(vr−1), u0)
in G. Note that r ≥ 2. W can either contain a cycle, or it can
be a path tracing itself back after some point. We show that
this closed walk has a cycle.
Suppose this closed walk does not have a cycle. Then, with-
out loss of generality, we can assume that it traces itself back
at some point vi. Therefore, the sequence ui, vi, u(i+1) mod r
is such that ui = u(i+1) mod r. This is a contradiction since
all the vertices in the original cycle are distinct and r ≥ 2.
Therefore, W contains a cycle C∗. We have
length(C) ≥ length(C∗) ≥ g(G)
which proves that g(H) ≥ g(G). Note that the second
inequality in the above equation follows from the fact that
C∗ is a cycle in G.
By the above lemma, (B(Rg))g∈N is a sequence of large-
girth ν-regular bipartite graphs. Using this sequence, it is pos-
sible to construct (see Algorithm 4) large-girth (c, d) regular
Tanner graphs for arbitrary c, d.
However, it should be noted that there is no standard con-
struction of (ν, g)-cages that works for all ν and g. Moreover,
the structures of cages for ν > 20 or for g > 15 are not
currently known. Though the existence of cages proves the
existence of large-girth regular LDPC codes, it does not result
in a generalized construction algorithm for these codes. In the
later sections, we will construct large-girth LDPC codes from
large-girth graphs that are not necessarily cages.
B. Existing Constructions for Tanner Graphs With Good Girth
A construction of regular large-girth LDPC codes was
proposed by Gallager in his monograph [25, Appendix C].
The progressive edge growth (PEG) algorithm [26] constructs
LDPC codes with a prescribed left (variable-node) degree
distribution and rate. Though empirical evidence shows that
PEG creates codes of good girth, we are unable to prove that
they are large-girth codes. A PEG-like algorithm to construct
almost regular large-girth graphs was proposed in [27]. A
modification of this algorithm to create almost (c, d)-regular
large-girth LDPC codes was published as the Almost Regular
large-Girth (ARG) algorithm [28]. Though ARG creates large-
girth LDPC codes, it cannot be used to create LDPC codes
for a pre-defined DDP.
Based on the large-girth regular graph construction in [29],
[30], Kim, et al. [31] constructed large-girth regular LDPC
codes of rate 1/q, for any prime power q. In other work, Mar-
gulis [32] constructed 2r-regular large-girth graphs and based
on his idea, Rosenthal and Vontobel [33] constructed large-
girth (3, 6)-regular LDPC codes using the algebraic structure
behind the construction of Ramanujan graphs proposed by
[15].
It can be noted that the above constructions produce only
large-girth LDPC codes of specific rates and specific (regular)
degree distributions. On the other hand, the construction
described in the next section produces large-girth graphs of
arbitrary rates and degree distributions.
C. Proposed Construction of Large-Girth Graphs
The adjacency matrix of a simple graph with n vertices is
an n× n matrix [ai,j ] such that ai,j = 1 whenever vertices i
and j are adjacent, and ai,j = 0 otherwise. We consider the
eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix. For a k-regular graph,
any eigenvalue µ is such that |µ| ≤ k. A Ramanujan graph is
a k-regular graph such that if µ is an eigenvalue and |µ| 6= k,
then |µ| ≤ 2√k − 1. For a detailed discussion of Ramanujan
graphs, see the book Davidoff, et al. [34].
6Lubotzky, et al. [15] provided a Cayley graph based con-
struction of certain Ramanujan graphs. For primes p and q,
they construct a family of graphs Xp,q with the following
properties.
Theorem 5 ([34, Thm. 4.2.2]). Let p, q be distinct, odd primes,
with q > 2
√
p. The graphs Xp,q are (p + 1)-regular graphs
that are connected and Ramanujan. Moreover,
1) If p is a quadratic residue modulo q, then Xp,q is a
non-bipartite graph with q(q
2−1)
2 vertices, satisfying the
girth estimate
g(Xp,q) ≥ 2 logp q
2) If p is a quadratic non-residue module q, then Xp,q is
a bipartite graph with q(q2 − 1) vertices, satisfying
g(Xp,q) ≥ 4 logp q − logp 4
For our purposes, we will not be using the Ramanujan
property of the graphs Xp,q; we will merely use the above
lower bounds on the girth.
When p is a quadratic residue modulo q, we can use the
construction in Algorithm 1 to generate a bipartite (p + 1)-
regular graph in q(q2− 1) vertices with girth at least 2 logp q.
Using Algorithm 1, we now have the following corollary.
Corollary 6. Given a prime p, for any n ∈ N it is possible to
construct a (p+1)-regular bipartite graph in q(q2−1) vertices
with girth at least 2 logp q for some prime q ≥ n based on the
construction of Lubotzky, et al.
We would like to construct k-regular bipartite graphs of
large girth where k is some arbitrary natural number, i.e., it is
not necessarily the successor of a prime number. We do this
as follows. We first find an integer s such that sk − 1 is a
prime number, say p. The existence of s (and p) is guaranteed
by the following.
Theorem 7 (Dirichlet’s Theorem on Arithmetic Progressions
[35, Chapter 7]). Given two positive integers a, b that are
relatively prime, i.e., gcd{a, b} = 1, the sequence (an+b)n∈N
contains an infinite number of primes.
Corollary 8. Given any positive integer k, it is always possible
to find s ∈ N such that sk− 1 is a prime. Moreover, there are
infinite such s.
Proof: It can easily be seen that gcd{k, k − 1} = 1.
Therefore, there are infinite prime numbers of the form rk +
(k − 1), where r ∈ N. Therefore, there are infinite prime
numbers of the form sk − 1, where s ∈ N.
Now, we know that for any arbitrary natural number k, we
can create a family of sk-regular graphs of large girth for some
natural number s. Using this family, we can create a family
of large-girth k-regular graphs by using Algorithm 2.
In this paper, we will only consider the creation of equal
sized partitions Ni in Step 1 of Algorithm 2. Under this
restriction, the partitioning of N(v) can be done in two
different ways.
• Deterministic version. We assume that the edges in the
graph G are in some simple ordering (e1, e2, . . . , eM ). If
Fig. 4. An illustration of Algorithm 2 to split a vertex.
Algorithm 2 Splitting a vertex into vertices of smaller degrees.
1: Given a vertex v in a graph G, we partition the set of all
its neighbours N(v) into N1, N2, . . . , Nk.
2: We create a new graph H by deleting v from G and
adding new vertices v1, v2, . . . , vk and connecting vi to
the vertices in Ni for all i.
N(v) = {ei1 , ei2 , . . . , eijk} with i1 ≤ i2 ≤ · · · ≤ ij , let
N1 = {ei1 , ei2 , . . . , eik}
N2 = {eik+1 , eik+2 , . . . , ei2k}
and so on.
• Random version. The partitioning of N(v) is done in a
random fashion.
Though the girth properties of the graphs obtained by the
deterministic and the random versions of Algorithm 2 are
similar, it is easier to count graphs of a particular configuration
when we use the deterministic version than when we use the
random version.
Lemma 9. Given a graph G, if H is a graph obtained by
splitting an arbitrary vertex of G according to either version
of Algorithm 2, then g(H) ≥ g(G).
Proof: Suppose H does not have any cycles. In this case,
g(H) =∞ and the lemma is true.
We are now left with the case where H has cycles. Consider
any cycle C in H . Let v be the vertex of G that is being split
and let Vnew = {v1, v2, . . . , vk} be the set of new vertices
created. By traversing along C and identifying vertices vi with
v, we will get a closed walk W in G. We show that W contains
a cycle.
If C has less than two vertices from the set Vnew, then W
is a cycle and we are done. Otherwise, C has at least two of
these vertices. We can pick vi, vj such that while traversing
from one to the other along C, we don’t encounter any other
vertices from Vnew. Let this path (excluding vi, vj) be denoted
by P . Since vi and vj are not adjacent and N(vi)∩N(vj) = ∅,
this path has at least two vertices. Therefore, vPv is a cycle
C∗ in W that is smaller than C. Since G contains the cycle
C∗, we have
length(C) ≥ length(C∗) ≥ g(G)
which shows that g(H) ≥ g(G).
Note that Algorithm 2 can sometimes create a disconnected
graph. That is, H may be disconnected even if G is connected.
However, we can see that Lemma 9 is valid regardless of any
disconnections introduced by node splitting. Furthermore, the
7proof of our main theorem relies only on Lemma 9 and is
valid even though some of the Tanner graphs in our ensemble
may be disconnected.
Algorithm 3 Constructing large-girth k-regular bipartite
graphs.
1: Given a positive integer k, find the smallest solution for
s ∈ N such that sk − 1 is a prime. The existence of
s is guaranteed by Dirichlet’s Theorem on Arithmetic
Progressions. Denote sk − 1 by p.
2: Pick a sequence of primes greater than 2
√
p. For each
such prime q, generate the graph Xp,q described in [15].
3: If p is a quadratic residue modulo q, then G = B(Xp,q).
Otherwise, G = Xp,q . In either case, G is an (sk)-regular
bipartite graph on q(q2−1) vertices and g(G) ≥ 2 logp q.
4: Split each vertex of G successively into s vertices of
degree k according to either version of Algorithm 2. Call
this new graph H .
5: H is a k-regular bipartite graph with sq(q2 − 1) vertices
and g(H) ≥ g(G) ≥ 2 logp q.
Algorithm 4 Constructing large-girth (c, d)-regular bipartite
graphs.
1: Let k = LCM{c, d}. Construct a sequence of k-regular
bipartite graphs of large girth according to Algorithm 3.
2: Given a k-regular bipartite graph G with sq(q2 − 1)
vertices and g(G) ≥ 2 logp q, let (Vs, Vc) be the bipartition
of the vertices. We have |Vs| = |Vc| = sq(q
2−1)
2 .
3: Split each vertex in Vs into k/c new vertices of degree
c each according to either version of Algorithm 2 to get
k
c
sq(q2−1)
2 left vertices of degree c.
4: Split each vertex in Vc into k/d new vertices of degree
d each according to either version of Algorithm 2 to get
k
d
sq(q2−1)
2 right vertices of degree d. The resultant graph
H is a (c, d)-regular bipartite graph with g(H) ≥ 2 logp q.
D. Strong Secrecy Using Irregular LDPC Codes Based on
Ramanujan Graphs
For a given DDP (λ, ρ), we can create a sequence of large-
girth (λ, ρ)-irregular LDPC codes (Cn) of increasing block-
length n using Algorithm 5. We denote the large-girth graphs
associated with Cn by Rn.
Theorem 10. For a given DDP (λ, ρ) with minimum left
degree lmin ≥ 3, the sequence of large-girth (λ, ρ)-irregular
LDPC codes (Cn) created using Algorithm 5 is such that
whenever  < th we have
EPMPb (Cn, ) = O (exp(−c1nc2)) (4)
for some positive constants c1, c2.
Proof: See Appendix B
The asymptotic decay of the bit-error probability achieved
by the codes in Thm. 10 is faster than the inverse cubic decay
Algorithm 5 Constructing large-girth (λ, ρ) irregular bipartite
graphs.
1: Let k be the least common multiple of all the left and
right degrees. Let a be the smallest positive integer such
that aλi, aρj ∈ N for all i, j.
2: Let s be the smallest natural number such that sak − 1
is a prime number. Call this prime number p. Choose
an arbitrarily prime q > 2
√
p. Construct an (ak)-regular
bipartite graph G0 according to Algorithm 3. G0 has
sq(q2 − 1) vertices and g(G0) ≥ 2 logp q.
3: Split each vertex of G0 into a vertices of degree k by
successively applying Algorithm 2 (either version) and
denote the resulting k-regular bipartite graph by G. G has
n0 vertices on the left and n0 vertices on the right, where
n0 =
asq(q2−1)
2 , and g(G) ≥ 2 logp q.
4: Let (v1, v2, . . . , vn0) be some ordering of the “left” ver-
tices in G and let (c1, c2, . . . , cn0) be some ordering of
the “right” vertices in G. Also, let (e1, e2, . . . , en0k) be
some ordering of the edges in G.
5: Let σ and pi be two randomly chosen permutation func-
tions over the set {1, 2, . . . , n0}.
6: Consider the ordered set (v′1, v
′
2, . . . , v
′
n0), where v
′
i =
vσ(i). In this ordered set,
• split the first n0λlmin vertices into n0kλlmin/lmin
vertices of degree lmin,
• split the next n0λlmin+1 vertices into
n0kλlmin+1/(lmin + 1) vertices of degree lmin + 1,
• · · ·
• split the last n0λlmax vertices into n0kλlmax/lmax
vertices of degree lmax.
In the above, we split the vertices according to the
deterministic version of Algorithm 2.
7: Do a similar operation for the check nodes using the
ordered set (c′1, c
′
2, . . . , c
′
n0), where c
′
j = cpi(j), and the
distribution ρ. The resulting graph H is a (λ, ρ) irregular
bipartite graph with
n =
aksq(q2 − 1)
2
∫ 1
0
λdx
vertices and girth at least 2 logp q.
required for strong secrecy. This directly implies that the duals
of our Ramanujan graph LDPC codes achieve strong secrecy
on the BEWC under the coset coding scheme.
E. Discussion
For a given DDP (λ, ρ), we have constructed a sequence
(Cn) of large-girth LDPC codes based on Ramanujan graphs.
For minimum left degree at least three, we showed that for
 < th, we have
EPMPb (Cn, ) = O(exp(−βna log(lmin−1)))
By Corollary 2, the dual sequence (C⊥n ) achieves strong
secrecy on BEWC(ξ) for ξ > 1− th.
81) Difference Between Regular and Irregular Codes: For
any large-girth regular LDPC code sequence (Cn), we have
PMPb (Cn, ) = O
(
exp(−βna log(lmin−1))
)
for  < th. This means that the dual sequence achieves strong
secrecy on BEWC(ξ) for ξ > 1− th.
For irregular codes constructed by Algorithm 5, we have
shown that
E
(
PMPb (Cn, )
)
= O
(
exp(−βna log(lmin−1))
)
for  < th. This means that on an average, the dual sequence
achieves strong secrecy on BEWC(ξ) for ξ > 1 − th.
Moreover, most codes in the dual sequence are concentrated
around this average strong secrecy property. This is because
the Markov inequality guarantees that, with probability tending
to 1, any LDPC code from the ensemble will have probability
of bit error smaller than 1
nk
(for any positive integer k).
Our result for regular LDPC codes is stronger than that
that of irregular LDPC codes. However, irregular LDPC codes
are important because they have 1 − th very close to their
rate. Therefore, irregular codes are instrumental in achieving
a secrecy rate very close to the BEWC secrecy capacity.
2) Gap Between Achievable Region and Secrecy Capacity:
For a secret information rate R, we are interested in the
minimum value of Eve’s erasure probability  for which we
can ensure strong secrecy over the BEWC using our scheme.
Since our proof works only for lmin ≥ 3, this involves finding
an optimal DDP of rate R and lmin ≥ 3 for which the BEC
threshold th is as high as possible. It can be noted that
th < 1− R. Most of the capacity achieving DDP sequences
require lmin = 2 (e.g., the tornado sequence and the right
regular sequence in [36]). Therefore, there is a small gap
between the strong secrecy rate achievable by our technique
and the secrecy capacity of the BEWC.
For example, when we performed a search using the LDP-
COPT online tool [37] for R = 0.5 and lmin ≥ 3, we found
that the maximum value of th = 0.4619 is achieved by the
DDP
λ(x) = 0.9043388x2 + 0.03300419x16 + 0.01434268x17
+ 0.03535427x18 + 0.01296008x99
ρ(x) = x10
This means that the duals of the LDPC codes constructed using
Algorithm 5 will achieve a strong secrecy rate of 0.5 over
BEWC() for all  > 0.5381. Note that for  close to 0.5381,
the secrecy capacity of the BEWC is close to 0.5381. Our
coding scheme will achieve a secrecy rate of 0.5 over this
channel, which is 7% less than the secrecy capacity.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this work, we have constructed LDPC codes whose girth
increases logarithmically in block-length using Ramanujan
graphs. In contrast to existing large-girth constructions, our
construction works for arbitrary irregular degree distribution
pairs. To our knowledge, this is the first such construction. We
have shown that the duals of these LDPC codes achieve strong
secrecy on the binary erasure wiretap channel (BEWC), when
their minimum left degree is at least three. To achieve secrecy
capacity on the BEWC, we require LDPC code ensembles
with degree-2 variable nodes. Since our current proof does
not apply to these codes, we must look for new techniques
to analyze them. A multiedge-type construction, similar to the
approach of [8], [9], might be required to achieve secrecy
capacity on the BEWC.
In addition, the Ramanujan graph ensemble is interesting in
the general area of LDPC coding even without the secrecy ap-
plication. In particular, one can show (through the relationship
between the girth and the stopping distance) that the minimum
distance of these codes grows at least as nb, for some b such
that 0 < b < 1. Further properties of this construction could
be explored in future work.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
For any x ∈ [0, 1], we have
(1− x)d−1 ≥ 1− (d− 1)x, ∀d ∈ N
⇒ ρ(1− x) =
rmax∑
d=2
ρd(1− x)d−1
≥
rmax∑
d=2
(1− (d− 1)x)ρd
= 1− (ravg − 1)x
⇒ 1− ρ(1− x) ≤ (ravg − 1)x
where ravg is the average check-node degree and rmax is the
maximum check-node degree. For 0 ≤ (ravg − 1)x ≤ 1,
f(, x) = λ(1− ρ(1− x))
a≤ λ((ravg − 1)x)
= 
lmax∑
i=lmin
λi((ravg − 1)x)i−1
b≤ 
lmax∑
i=lmin
λi((ravg − 1)x)lmin−1
⇒ f(, x) ≤ ((ravg − 1)x)lmin−1 =: g(, x) (5)
Note that (a) follows from the monotonicity of λ(x), and (b)
follows from the given condition 0 ≤ (ravg−1)x ≤ 1. To make
the notation easier, let us denote A = (ravg−1)lmin−1. Since
we are operating in the region  < th where (xt) converges
to zero, there exists an R such that Axlmin−2R ≤ 1 and (ravg−
1)xR ≤ 1. The first inequality will be used later in the proof.
Let us construct a sequence zR+i+1 = g(, zR+i) with zR =
xR. It is immaterial what zi takes when i < R. We then claim
that xR+i ≤ zR+i for any non-negative integer i. We can
prove this by induction. The base case is when i = 0 and it
is true by our choice of zR. Assuming the claim is true for
some integer i ≥ 0, we have
xR+i+1 = f(, xR+i) ≤ g(, xR+i) ≤ g(, zR+i) = zR+i+1
9The first inequality is due to Eqn. (5) and the second inequality
is due to the monotonicity of g and the induction hypothesis.
This proves the claim.
We have,
zR+1 = Az
lmin−1
R
zR+i = A
1+(lmin−1)+(lmin−1)2+···+(lmin−1)i−1z(lmin−1)
i
R
= A
(lmin−1)i−1
lmin−2 z
(lmin−1)i
R
= A
−1
lmin−2
(
A
1
lmin−2xR
)(lmin−1)i
= A
−1
lmin−2 exp
(
(lmin − 1)i
(
logA
lmin − 2 + log xR
))
= A
−1
lmin−2 exp
(−αR(lmin − 1)i)
Due to our choice of R, αR , −1lmin−2 logA − log xR is
positive. In fact, we can choose R arbitrarily large, making
xR arbitrarily small and αR arbitrarily large. For t ≥ R, we
have
xt ≤ zt
= A
−1
lmin−2 exp
(−αR(lmin − 1)t−R)
= A
−1
lmin−2 exp
(
− αR
(lmin − 1)R (lmin − 1)
t
)
= A
−1
lmin−2 exp
(−β(lmin − 1)t)
Note that β , αR
(lmin−1)R > 0. Therefore, we have
xt = O
(
exp(−β(lmin − 1)t)
)
as t→∞
To prove the second half, we note that for x ∈ [0, 1]
L(x) =
∑
Lix
i ≤
∑
Lix
i−1
=
1∫ 1
0
λ(x)dx
lmax∑
i=lmin
λi
i
xi−1
≤ 1
lmin
∫ 1
0
λ(x)dx
λ(x)
⇒ yt ≤ 1
lmin
∫ 1
0
λ(x)dx
xt
⇒ yt = O
(
exp(−β(lmin − 1)t)
)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THM. 10
The only sources of randomness in Algorithm 5 for a given
large-girth graph G (at the end of Step 3) are the permutation
functions σ and pi. The probability distribution of Rn given G
is easier to analyze than that of Rn when G is not specified.
Clearly, (4) is true whenever
E
(
PMPb (Cn, )|G
)
= O (exp(−c1nc2)) (6)
is true uniformly for all possible G in Step 3 of Algorithm 5.
Note that PMPb (Cn, ) denotes the probability of bit-error
after infinite iterations of the MP algorithm (or equivalently,
when a stopping set is encountered). This probability is clearly
less than the probability of bit-error after a finite number of
iterations. Therefore (6) is true whenever
E
(
PMPb (Cn, , t(n))|G
) ≤ A(n) = O (exp(−c1nc2)) (7)
is true for some function t(n). The role played by the quantity
A(n) is to ensure that we are able to upper bound the left hand
side uniformly in G. We pick t(n) = a log n, where a > 0
is such that g(Rn) ≥ 4a log n + 2. We know that a exists
because of the large-girth property of Rn. Let amax be the
maximum possible value for a.
Proposition 11. For any δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a natural
number N such that for all n ≥ N we have
E
(
PMPb (Cn, , t(n))|G
) ≤ 1
1− δ yt(n)() (8)
where yt(n)() is the quantity defined in Lemma 3.
We know from Lemma 3 that
yt(n)() = O
(
exp(−β(lmin − 1)t(n))
)
= O (exp(−β(lmin − 1)a logn))
= O
(
exp(−βna log(lmin−1))
)
The above equation, along with Proposition 11, completes the
proof of the theorem.
Proof of Proposition 11: Consider the computation
graph C˚t of Rn (we write t for t(n) to make the notation
less cumbersome). Clearly, P(C˚t = T ) > 0 if and only if
P(T˚t = T ) > 0.
Let T be any valid level-t tree in the sense that P(T˚t = T ) >
0. Let Pe(T, ) be the probability that the root node of T is
in error when the tree code associated with T is transmitted
over BEC() and decoded with t iterations of the MP decoder.
Note the following two equations
yt() =
∑
P(T˚t = T )Pe(T, )
E
(
PMPb (Cn, , t)|G
)
=
∑
P(C˚t = T |G)Pe(T, )
From the above, we can see that the proof is complete once
we show that for some natural number N , we have
P(C˚t = T |G) ≤ 1
1− δP(T˚t = T )
for all n ≥ N .
Let T be a valid level-t tree with i0 being the degree of
the root node. Let this tree have pi variable nodes of degree
i (including the root node, but excluding the leaf nodes) and
qj check nodes of degree j. We have
P(T˚t = T ) = Li0λpi0−1i0
lmax∏
i=3,i6=i0
λpii
rmax∏
j=2
ρ
qj
j (9)
Now, consider C˚t. The probability that the root node v has
degree i0 is clearly Li0 . The i0 edges incident with v in Rn
will correspond to i0 edges in G incident with u, the parent
node of v. Let b(1), b(2), . . . , b(i0) be the i0 neighbours of u
in G corresponding to those edges. Let c(1), c(2), . . . , c(i0) be
the daughter nodes in Rn corresponding to the same edges.
The number of ways of choosing the permutation function pi
10
such that node c(1) has degree j is equal to the number of
ways of putting b(1) into a slot that corresponds to degree
j, which is n0ρj . Note that these slots are numbered. Here,
n0 = 2n/
(
k
∫ 1
0
λdx
)
is the number of left (right) vertices in
G, where k is the LCM of all the degrees in (λ, ρ).
In general, whenever T is a valid level-t tree, we have
P(C˚t = T ) = Li0
(
n0λi0−1
pi0−1
)
(pi0 − 1)!
×
(
n0 − 1−
∑lmax
i=2 pi
)
!
n0!
lmax∏
i=lmin
i 6=i0
(
n0λi
pi
)
pi!
×
(
n0 −
∑rmax
j=rmin
qj
)
!
n0!
rmax∏
j=rmin
(
n0ρj
qj
)
qj !
(10)
We note the following inequality.(
n0 − 1−
∑lmax
i=2 pi
)
!
(
n0 −
∑rmax
j=rmin
qj
)
!
n0! n0!
<
1
(n0 −
∑
pi)(
∑
pi)−1 (n0 −
∑
qj)
∑
qj
(11)
We also see that
Li0
(
n0λi0−1
pi0−1
)
(pi0 − 1)!
lmax∏
i=lmin
i6=i0
(
n0λi
pi
)
pi!
rmax∏
j=rmin
(
n0ρj
qj
)
qj !
< Li0(n0λi0)
pi0−1
lmax∏
i=lmin
i 6=i0
(n0λi)
pi
rmax∏
j=rmin
(n0ρj)
qj
= n
(
∑
pi+
∑
qj)−1
0 Li0λ
pi0−1
i0
lmax∏
i=lmin
i 6=i0
λpii
rmax∏
j=rmin
ρ
qj
j
= n
(
∑
pi+
∑
qj)−1
0 P(T˚t = T ) (12)
Substituting (11) and (12) in (10), we get
P(C˚t = T ) < P(T˚t = T )(
1−
∑
pi
n0
)(∑ pi)−1 (
1−
∑
qj
n0
)∑ qj (13)
The proof is complete once we show that(
1−
∑
pi
n0
)(∑ pi)−1(
1−
∑
qj
n0
)∑ qj
→ 1 as n→∞
(14)
First, we note that
∑
pi and
∑
qj grow exponentially in t.
This means that there exist constants α1, α2, β1, β2 > 0 such
that
α1n
β1 <
∑
pi,
∑
qj < α2n
β2 (15)
We have
1 >
(
1−
∑
pi
n0
)(∑ pi)−1(
1−
∑
qj
n0
)∑ qj
>
(
1− α2n
β2
n0
)α2nβ2−1(
1− α2n
β2
n0
)α2nβ2
=
(
1− α2n
β2
n0
)2α2nβ2−1
The proof is complete once we show that(
1−
1
2α2k
∫ 1
0
λdx
n1−β2
)nβ2
→ 1 (16)
For this, we pick the constant a ∈ (0, amax] small enough so
that β2 < 0.5. Observe that for any θ > 1 and α > 0, we have
lim
n→∞
(
1− α
nθ
)n
= 1 (17)
Substituting m = nβ2 in the left hand side of (16), we have(
1−
1
2α2k
∫ 1
0
λdx
m(1−β2)/β2
)m
which goes to 1 as m→∞.
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